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The electoral system for the state presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantees the 
representation of the three constituent people, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, but it violates the 
political rights of other ethnic minorities and of citizens who do not identify themselves with 
any ethnic group. Following the 2009 judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Bosnia is urged to reform its electoral law. This paper discusses alternative practices of 
ethnically based political representation, and their possible application for the Bosnian state 
presidency elections. Several innovative electoral models that satisfy fair political and legal 
criteria for desirable electoral dynamics in divided societies can be envisaged in the Bosnian 
context. Specifically, these are: the introduction of a single countrywide electoral district, the 
adoption of the single non-transferable vote, and the application of a geometrical mean rule. 
They guarantee the representation of the three constituent people, while strengthening inter-
ethnic voting and giving chances to non-nationalist candidates to be elected.  
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1  Introduction° 
Fifteen years after the peace agreement of Dayton, the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is criticised for a number of shortcomings. Political decision-making is in a deadlock (Trnka et al. 
2009, p. 89); the pattern of initial elections, where hardline nationalists of each side have been 
elected into office, has largely survived (Pugh & Cobble 2001; Pickering 2009; Belloni 2007). 
Additionally, several state institutions appear as ethnically discriminatory (International Crisis 
Group 1999; Belloni 2007, pp. 87-88; Venice Commission 2001; Bose 2002, p. 238). Could 
constitutional changes help to eradicate the discriminatory practices, and at the same time provide 
for a better functioning political system, which fosters cross-ethnic political competition? 
Institutional engineering is the art of providing for rules and institutions in order to pursue 
political goals – such as creating a functioning multiethnic democracy (Sartori 1968; Reilly 2001; 
Grofman & Stockwell 2003, etc.). Drawing on the idea that purposefully selected political 
institutions can affect political dynamics, this article discusses several alternative models for the 
election of the state presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We argue that different reform 
modules would eliminate today’s discriminatory character of the presidency elections, and that 
they might foster cross-ethnic political competition and help to elect ethnically moderate parties 
and politicians. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina can undoubtedly be characterised as deeply ethnically divided, and 
this ethnic divide is also reflected in political representation. Apart from the three large 
constituent ethnic groups, the Bosniaks (Bosnians with a Muslim identity – including those who 
do not practice their religion, but identify ethnically as such – estimated 48% in 2000), the Croats 
(14%) and the Serbs (37%), Bosnia counts further small ethnic minorities. The most important 
ones are Roma (estimated between 0.2% and 10% of the population). Also, other parts of the 
population used not to identify ethnically (0.4%), have an ethnically mixed background, or 
defined themselves as Yugoslav in the last census of 1991 (5.5%),i - a category often chosen by 
citizens who do not identify with any of the other groups, or with a mixed identity. Since 1991 
(and despite the changes in the ethnic structure through war, ethnic cleansing, and migration) no 
new census has been conducted. A new census would be politically sensitive, as it might 
legitimise the ethnic structure that resulted from the war. 
The political institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, introduced with the 1995 Dayton peace 
agreement, heavily rely on the constituent ethnic groups. At all levels, and in all parts of the state, 
institutions respect the delicate ethnic balance ensured for Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. This 
system, however, violates the rights of other ethnic groups and many individual citizens to 
achieve political representation in state institutions, among others in the three-member Bosnian 
state presidency. After the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in 2009, Bosnia has to 
reform its electoral law in order to allow for the representation of ‘others’ – those citizens who do 
not identify with any of the three constituent people.ii 
The state presidency is composed of a Croat and a Bosniak member elected from the territory 
of the Federation (FBiH – one of two territorial entities, where after the war mostly Bosniaks and 
Croats reside) and of Serbian member elected from the other entity, ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS). As 
it stands currently, it excludes all other minorities and citizens who do not identify with any ethnic 
groups, as well as Bosniaks and Croats from the ‘Republika Srpska’ and Serbs from the 
Federation from the eligibility criteria to run for the presidential office. The ethnic logic of the 
election of the state presidency fosters the election of polarising candidates, elected solely by their 
own ethnic kin.Many studies have pointed out and criticised the ethnic nature of elections in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (for instance, Pugh & Cobble 2001; Caspersen 2004; Bieber 1999; 
Pickering 2009; International Crisis Group 1998,  1999). Manning (2004) provides a brilliant 
overview over electoral institutions and political parties. Some argue that the bad performance of 
democracy and ethnic tolerance under the current rules reveals limits of institutional engineering 
(Manning & Antić 2003, pp. 55-56). Others contend that institutional reforms might lead to better 
results, and propose the introduction of a preferential voting system (Caspersen 2004, p. 582) or 
of a quota system, where every voter casts a vote for candidates of different ethnic groups 
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(International Crisis Group 1999, pp. 8-12). Such a solution, as other models that flexibilise ethnic 
quotas, however, face the risk that the largest groups in the population would de facto control the 
mandate that so far belonged to one of the minor communal groups (see section 3). 
This paper discusses three possible reforms of the election of the Bosnian state presidency: the 
introduction of a single countrywide electoral district, the adoption of the single non-transferable 
vote, and the application of a geometrical mean rule. Starting from the premise that any 
alternative that does not contain guarantees for the three constituent groups might be politically 
unfeasible, we discuss how a solution that respects the representation pledge for each group might 
still allow for competitive elections across ethnic boundaries, without discriminating ‘others’. 
 
2  Models of direct and indirect ethnic quotas 
There are inherent problems with enforcing regulations that create an advantage for voters or 
candidates who belong to a certain ethnic group, or for minority parties or organisations. Any 
ethnically based rule requires an agency that checks whether voters or candidates belong to an 
ethnic minority, or that defines the ethnic identity of a political party. Four solutions for positive 
discrimination of ethnic minorities or of their representatives are the most typical ones (table 1).iii 
Ethnic identities of voters, parties, or candidates are often difficult to establish – needless to say , 
the distinction of persons by ethnicity might be controversial, as ethnic identities themselves are 
flexible and subject to interpretation. 
Therefore, any positive discrimination rule risks to be open to strategic behaviour – which 
might bring about abusive outcomes. In the absence of an agency that defines ethnic belonging, 
individuals can identify with a particular ethnic group, or switch between different identities, in 
order to get stronger political impact (e.g. Alionescu 2004). Hence, efforts to guarantee the 
representation of ethnic groups and special rules to secure the access of minorities to political 
office might have unintended consequences. 
 
Type of positive discrimination  Problem 
Indirect identification, based on the 
residential area of minorities 
Only applicable to minorities that live compactly. 
Voters are treated differently based 
on their ethnicity 
Identification relies on single voters, so that strategic voting is 
possible. Not all voters might want to identify ethnically. 
Disadvantages for multi‐ethnic parties, as they have voters both 
among the majority and the minority. 
Parties are treated differently if they 
claim to represent minority interests 
Creates competitive disadvantages for multi‐ethnic parties, 
trying to appeal for minority votes. 
Candidates are treated differently, 
based on their ethnicity 
Requires identification of candidates based on their ethnic 
identity; might exclude ‘other’ groups or those candidates who 
do not declare an identity. 
Table 1: How can ethnic minorities be identified and discriminated positively? 
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Party-based rules (rules that address electoral lists) guarantee seats for minority parties or 
minority organisations, giving them advantages over lists of the ethnic majority and over multi-
ethnic electoral lists (e.g. guarantees for electoral lists of minorities, as in Kosovo or in Romania). 
The rules create institutional incentive for elections on a solely ethnic basis, instead of the 
promotion of multi-ethnic and conciliating parties, and they further require an identification of a 
party’s ethnic identity, which can be difficult. The absence of an instance that inspects parties’ 
ethnic identities makes the rules very open to abuse. 
Candidate-based quotas count all representatives belonging to an ethnic group, no matter if 
they were elected from ethnically exclusive party lists or from the lists of multi-ethnic parties. 
Such quotas apply today for the election of the Bosnian state presidency (combined with territorial 
provisions), the upper house of the national parliament, and the entity parliaments. In the house of 
peoples (upper house), each of the three constituent people counts five members. And in the 
assemblies of the two entities, counting 98 or 83 members, each of the three constituent people 
gets a quota of at least four members. 
Countries providing special electoral districts for minority voters need to make a distinction of 
voters according to their ethnic identity (e.g. special districts for ethnic minorities, as employed in 
Croatia and in Slovenia). This might put in a difficult situation those citizens with an unclear or 
mixed identity or belonging to a non-recognised minority, as they are forced to choose one of the 
officially recognised ethnic identities. 
Finally, territorial boundaries might guarantee minority representation, such as in Montenegro, 
where Albanian minority regions form a separate electoral district in parliamentary elections. 
Without any explicit ethnical identification of voters, parties or candidates, the special district de 
facto guarantees a number of ethnic Albanian members of parliament. Yet, such solutions only 
work for groups that are mainly concentrated in small (almost ethnically exclusive) areas. 
 
2.1  Application of ethnic quotas to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The application of indirect, territorial quotas would be problematic in the Bosnian case for several 
reasons. 
First, Bosnia does not provide for the compact settlement structure of the ethnic groups that 
shall be protected by a quota. Certainly, the ‘Republika Srpska’ (RS) defines the territory, where 
today most of the ethnic Serbs live concentrated, so that an election of a member of presidency by 
the majority of voters of the ‘Republika Srpska’ de facto guarantees that this member is an ethnic 
Serb. Similarly, Croat politicians increasingly call for a separated regional electoral district. 
Although settlement areas of the ethnic Croats can be defined, mainly in three cantons in 
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Herzegovina, the formation of a mainly Croat electoral district is neither wishful, as it would lead 
to one more de facto territorial split of the country along ethnic lines, nor politically feasible.  
Second, territorially based ethnic quotas represent a delicate issue, given that the current 
territorial division is a result of the 1992-5 war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. But problems go 
beyond political symbolism: in (majoritarian) elections of members of the state presidency, only 
candidates belonging to the overwhelming ethnic majority in each region could realistically win. 
This means that local minorities are, in fact, excluded from representation, affecting voters who 
have remained a minority in a region, after their co-ethnics have escaped during or after the war. 
Hence, this de-facto discrimination would hurt a particularly vulnerable group of citizens: refu-
gees, voting in the place of their origin, returnees, and those few who have resisted ethnic clean-
sing and remained in their home town. 
As a consequence, any ethnic representation rule for the Bosnian state presidency can only be 
direct, and based on the candidate’s party or on the candidate’s declared identity. Party-based 
quotas would give special privileges to those parties that are ethnically defined – and punish 
multi-ethnic political parties and conciliating forces. In effect, multi-ethnic parties with 
overwhelming support from one ethnic group might become ethnic again. 
Candidate-based quotas directly guarantee the representation of a candidate of the protected 
minorities, but candidates can decide strategically which identity is best for increasing their 
chances in elections. Under candidate- and party-based quotas, it is not guaranteed that elected 
candidates receive the majority of votes from the ethnic group they aim to represent. The topic is 
hotly debated in Bosnia, as repeatedly (in 2006 and in 2010), the Croat member of the state 
presidency, Željko Komšić (SDP), was supposedly elected mainly from Bosniak votes.iv Whether 
minority candidates elected almost exclusively by the majority can credibly represent the interests 
of the ethnic minorities is questionable. 
Ethnic quotas require either an instance determining the ethnic identity of candidates or self-
declaration. The experiences both in Bosnia and elsewhere with self-declaration are mixed. Ejup 
Ganic, elected in 1990 as member of the Yugoslavs to the state presidency, was elected later as 
the Bosniak member of the same institution. Many citizens might have unclear ethnic identities, a 
or change their self-perception over time, but the presumption of strategic identification remains, 
undermining the legitimacy of the electoral system. 
2.2  Proposals to reform the presidential elections in Bosnia 
To resolve the current discrimination of members of ‘other’ ethnic groups, a number of proposals 
to reform the election of the Bosnian state presidency are being discussed. The website 
www.ustavnareforma.ba and Hodžić and Stojanović (2011) give an insight into the plethora of 
reform ideas. The easiest solution is simply to turn the presidency into a ceremonial function, so 
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that it becomes even less relevant. Several Bosniak or multiethnic parties (Stranka za 
Demokratsku Akciju (SDA), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Naša Stranka, etc.), would like to 
introduce a single president, possibly with vice presidents belonging to different ethnic groups, 
and with a rule that the presidency rotates between different groups.v The civic-oriented 
Građanska demokratska stranka (GDS) advocates a single president, and rules that hinder that 
(s)he, the prime minister and the presidents of the two parliamentary houses belong to the same 
ethnic group (similar: International Crisis Group 2002). It is questionable whether a solution, 
where not all three constituent people are represented with equal rank might be acceptable. Most 
of all, the question of how many members the presidency (including vice-presidents) consists, 
whether and how ethnic quotas are established, and how they are elected, remains. Several 
parliamentary parties discuss the possibility of indirect elections through the Bosnian parliament. 
However, also for indirect elections, electoral rules need to be defined. Changing the electoral 
body does not resolve the problems attached to the election. Consider that whatever electoral rules 
are applied in parliament, strategic coordination in a small assembly is much easier than among to 
the whole population. Therefore, strategic voting that undermines the substantial representation of 
minority groups become even more feasible (see next section). Indirect elections would further 
aggravate the problem of lacking representation of ‘others’ in the House of Peoples (Senate of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), which has been criticised by the European Court for Human Rights in 
the same judgement as the presidential electoral rules. The Stranka za BiH (SBiH), a party which 
is mainly elected by Bosniaks, proposes a fourth member of the state presidency, elected by 
‘others’. Similarly, the Bosniak dominated Savez za bolju budućnost (SBB) advocates a 
presidency with three vice-presidents, but without specifying the election rules for these positions. 
Both the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (2005) and the Assembly of ‘Republika 
Srpska’vi propose some flexibilisation of the ethnic quotas, prescribing one member from RS and 
two from the Federation, but maximally one of the same ethnic group. All these solution would, 
however, allow the overwhelmingly ethnic Bosniak voters in the Federation to elect a Bosniak 
member and a member of ‘others’ who is loyal to the Bosniak interests. If there are two seats from 
the Federation, Bosniak voters could this way permanently exclude ethnic Croats from the state 
presidency. The possibility that a Bosniak, a Bosnian Croat or a member of ‘others’ with voting 
rights in ‘Republika Srpska’ might be elected to the state presidency would remain hypothetical. 
A earlier proposal (formally not conform with the judgement of the European Court which came 
later) conserves the three-member presidency, but proposes the election in a single nationwide 
constituency, giving each voter three votes (United States Institute of Peace 2000; similar: 
International Crisis Group 1999, pp. 8-12). This faces the risk that the larger groups elect their 
political allies on all three seats, de-facto majorising the state presidency. 
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3  Desirable criteria for the election of state presidency 
Based on the discussion of the current problems of the Bosnian presidential electoral system, on 
the discussion about forms of ethnic quotas, and on our considerations about the political 
feasibility of reforms, we can formulate a number of criteria to which an ideal system for the 
election of the Bosnian state presidency should adhere. 
1. Representation guarantees for the three constituent people, and possibility for ‘others’ to be 
elected. While the possibility to elect ‘others’ is a requirement of the European Court, a rule 
that would not maintain the representation guarantee of the three constituent people would 
risk to lead to permanent exclusion of some of the constituent people, and thus be politically 
unfeasible. This means that a state presidency with less than four members (the three 
constituent groups, plus the possibility for ‘others’ to get elected) is impossible to accomplish. 
However, it does not exclude the possibility of reforming the organisation of the state 
executive, with more executive power, or having a state president with strong vice-presidents. 
2. External minorities can be represented and elect their member in the presidency. 
3. Hindering political dominance by one ethnic group. No group should be able to hold a 
majority of seats in the state presidency (unless if other groups express this will in elections), 
and no group should be able to determine the election of a majority of the seats in the state 
presidency. 
4. Enhancement of cross-ethnic campaigning. The rules should encourage candidates to take 
conciliating positions, and allow for inter-ethnic voting. 
5. Ruling out strategic voting. The votes of each constituent people should have substantial 
influence on the election of its member of the presidency. The representatives of smaller 
ethnic groups should not be decided by the votes of one of the larger groups, to avoid a 
scenario in which Bosniaks elect their favourite candidate as the Croat member of the state 
presidency (Komšić case). This does not rule out cross-ethnic voting, as long as the member 
of the state presidency representing a minority is supported by this minority too. 
The following sections discuss several reform proposals for the Bosnian state presidency electoral 
system, and assess whether they fulfil the outlined criteria. 
 
4  Borrowing ideas from the integrationalist school of electoral systems 
The question of which institutional system might be best to fulfil the needs of ethnically divided 
societies – and in line with this the choice of the electoral system – has preoccupied scholars of 
comparative politics over decades. In many aspects, the institutional system of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has embraced the consociationalist advice (Lijphart 1977,  1994) – implementing an 
institutional order that includes all three communal groups recognised by the constitution into all 
aspects of political decision-making, providing them with far-reaching veto rights, and adopting a 
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federal system that could hardly be more decentralised (Bieber 2004). However, the Bosnian 
institutional system suffers from several illnesses which in some aspects resemble the critique of 
the consociationalist school that is put forward in the literature: it lacks of institutional incentives 
for politicians to enhance the political integration of the country, and propose policies that appeal 
to all ethnic groups, and not only to their ethnic pals. Further, the Bosnian system suffers from 
institutional blockades that emerge because politicians elected separately by each ethnic 
community do not manage to agree on compromises that can withstand the manifold veto powers 
(Rothchild & Roeder 2005; Belloni 2007; Chivvis & Đogo 2010,etc.).  
Instead, the integrationalist school proposes that strong political power-holders are elected by 
electoral rules that empower those politicians with a conciliating program – which have best 
chances to be supported by different communal groups (Horowitz 1985,  2003; Reilly 2001). 
However, it turns out that majoritarian voting systems, and especially the Alternative Vote, which 
are promoted by integrationalist scholars, often do not hold their promises, as they can only 
function under very tight assumptions (Fraenkel & Grofman 2004,  2006; Bochsler 2009). 
Majoritarian electoral systems might have a conciliating effect if the voter basis is evenly split 
into two groups – so that candidates who aim to be elected need to rely on the support of both 
ethnic groups in order to get a majority of votes. In countries where this is not the case, the 
proportion of communal groups cannot be changed – especially in the context of national 
presidential elections. This is why Bose (2002, pp. 234-238) argues that they are not practicable in 
Bosnia. However, there are innovative solutions to adapt the electoral system accordingly, so that 
no 1:1 split is needed. 
Electoral engineering with majoritarian systems difficultly works if a candidate or a party can 
easily win a mandate with the support of one group only. However, electoral engineering provides 
for very strong incentives for inter-ethnic campaigning and vote pooling if there is a remainder 
seat allocated to the party that has the largest number of remaining votes. Like this, it creates 
incentives to win additional votes across ethnic boundaries (Cox 1997, pp. 108-109). Parties and 
candidates with an inter-ethnic campaign are most likely to win such remaining seats. This idea 
can be expressed in mathematical terms. For elections with one seat by majority rule (absolute 
majority of votes required), at a population ratio of 1:1, no candidate can win without inter-ethnic 
votes. Hence, this situation promotes candidates with conciliating programs and inter-ethnic 
campaigns. The strategic situation is created if 3 seats are elected by the single non-transferable 
vote (each voter has one vote, threshold applies, see section 6 below), where 25% of the voters 
narrowly fail winning a mandate. In this situation, with population ratios of 1:3 or 2:2, one of the 
three seats is inter-ethnically competitive. 5-seat elections (with single non-transferable vote) 
require a population ratio of 1:5, 2:4 or 3:3. By this logic, to make presidential elections in Bosnia 
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competitive between the different ethnic groups, it is necessary that their representatives compete 
for the same seats, under a limited voting system, and adjust the number of seats to be filled 
strategically, so that the ethnic structure of the Bosnian population is reflected in inter-ethnically 
competitive elections. Based on this short mathematically-driven introduction of the idea of 
integrationalist voting systems, we show that they are compatible with a number of further criteria 
that should apply for presidential elections in Bosnia. 
5  Moving to a single national electoral district? 
Moving to a single countrywide electoral district might lead to more inclusive elections to the 
Bosnian state presidency. All candidates would be elected countrywide. This is the sole way to 
include those citizens who could not, so far, be elected to the highest office, and this offers more 
opportunities for cross-ethnic voting.  
A single electoral district would allow also Bosniaks and ethnic Croats with voting rights in 
the ‘Republika Srpska’ and ethnic Serbs who vote in the Federation to elect the candidates of their 
ethnic group, or to run for presidency. With the current rules, these citizens have a right to vote, 
but can only vote for those candidates of the ethnic group(s) that are politically dominant in their 
respective entity.vii Dispersed minorities would benefit from being unified in one district, as they 
could commonly vote for their preferred candidate. In district-based electoral systems, groups that 
live concentrated in one district have a considerable advantage over dispersed groups, as all their 
votes count in the same district, while the votes of dispersed groups are divided between the 
districts (Bochsler 2011). A single nationwide electoral district could also help moderate 
candidates to win more votes across ethnic boundaries. Today’s division of the elections in two 
districts prevents any potential cross-ethnic votes, as Bosniak and Croat candidates are not eligible 
for receiving votes from most ethnic Serbs (living in RS), while Serbian candidates are not 
eligible for being elected by most Bosniaks and Croat voters (living in the Federation). 
A single nationwide electoral district in Bosnia would be combined with ethnic quotas. Such a 
combination could, nevertheless, open the door for strategic voting for candidates of other ethnic 
groups. Yet, strategic cross-ethnic voting in the Bosnian presidency has been a consequence of 
ethnic quotas. Notably, the introduction of a (quasi-)proportional electoral system instead of – or 
besides – ethnic quotas would reduce the potential impact of strategic voting, as each group could 
then autonomously select at least one member of presidency, even if some voters still vote 
strategically (see next section). The move would allow Bosnian politicians to get a national 
mandate, and to be accountable to the electorate in the whole country. In the long run, it 
encourages politicians to promote programs that are popular with voters of all parts of the country. 
6  Single (non‐)transferable vote instead of majority rule? 
Under the current electoral rule, only three candidates – one for each constituent people – are 
elected to the state presidency. To allow other citizens to run for the highest position, the 
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elimination of the quota for the three constituent people does not appear as a viable solution. For 
due political reasons, only the addition of a further member (or several) to the presidency might 
give other ethnic groups access to it. However, the electoral rules should hinder large ethnic 
groups to elect their allies on guaranteed minority seats to the state presidency. 
Instead, in this paper we discuss the addition of non-ethnically defined seats to the state 
presidency, in order to open the electoral competition to all ethnic groups. A five-seat presidency, 
elected by the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in a single national electoral district, might 
serve this goal. It could be combined with a seat guarantee for each of the three constituent 
peoples. Under the SNTV, there are several seats to be filled in the same district, but each voter 
has only one vote for one candidate. Those elected are the candidates with the highest number of 
votes (on top, ethnic quotas might apply, if there is political demand for such). The SNTV 
protects the representation of political minorities, and has, thus, (quasi-)proportional features (Cox 
& Rosenbluth 1994; Grofman 1999; Cox 1997, p. 109): the political majority needs to split its 
votes on all its candidates. If the political minority concentrates on one or few candidates, the 
political majority does not have sufficient votes to occupy all seats that are allocated. Therefore, 
either the majority voluntarily leaves a part of the seats to the minority, or otherwise – if the 
minority is sizeable enough and coordinates on one or few candidates – the minority will defeat 
some of the candidates of the majority. This logic can also be transferred to a multi-ethnic 
context: either the parties of the largest ethnic group only present candidates for some of the 
mandates (approximately as many as their group weights proportionally), or otherwise candidates 
of smaller ethnic groups can easily win mandates, if voters of the minority vote in a unified matter 
for one or few candidates.viii 
In Bosnia, SNTV with five seats in a national district with ethnic quotas would leave the 
fourth and the fifth seat open to inter-ethnic electoral competition. Our exemplary calculation 
shows possible and plausible scenarios (table 2). We have used the most recent available results of 
parliamentary elections, of 2006, in order to discuss possible scenarios of presidential elections.ix 
 
Political party or coalition  vote % in 2010  number of seats in 5‐seat district 
Bosniak & multi‐ethnic parties (overall)  52 – 55%   
SDP + small allies  18‐20%  1 secure seat 
SDA + SBiH  18‐19%  1 secure seat 
SBB + small Bosniak and multi‐ethnic 
parties 
15‐17%  chances to win 5th seat  
     
     
Coalition of Croat parties  10 – 12%  1 guaranteed seat 
     
Serb parties (overall)  33 – 35%   
SNSD  17‐18%  1 secure seat 
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coalition of other Serb parties  16‐17%  chances to win 5th seat 
 
Table 2: Tentative  scenario  for Bosnian presidential elections  in a  single nationwide 5‐seat district, 
according  to  the  single non‐transferable  vote  rule. Based on  the  results of  the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. Results obtained from Electoral Commission (www.izbori.ba, accessed on 20 October 2010), 
own calculation. 
 
For our scenario, we use the results of the 2010 parliamentary elections (votes added up for the 
whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and we further arrange them into coalitions of co-
ethnic parties (based on the incentives to build coalitions of about 18% of votes, on the parties’ 
coalition behaviour in the presidential elections, and on coalition statements in the media). 
In a five-seat district by SNTV, each candidate winning 17%-18% of the votes obtains a 
secure seat.x This implies that the Serbs can count on one secure seat, which in 2010 would have 
gone to the SNSD. Further, the Bosniak votes guarantee two secure seats – one of which goes to 
the candidates of the multi-ethnic SDP. The second seat is secure, if the two natural allies SDA 
and SBiH agree on a common candidate – as only a common candidate can secure their seat in the 
presidency. The Croat parties are guaranteed a mandate by law. 
The fifth mandate remains inter-ethnically competitive. It enhances the chances of candidates 
belonging to ‘other’ groups to be elected. Our scenario identifies two coalitions with chances to 
win the mandate. 
Either, the Bosniak and multi-ethnic parties might win a third mandate. Our scenario plays 
with an anti-establishment coalition around the third-largest party in this field, business man 
Fahrudin Radončić’s SBB, and further small Bosniak and multi-ethnic parties, which have kept 
their oppositional image, as they do not represent a major player in governments in Bosnia. They 
might jointly win some 15%-17% of the votes. The full mobilisation of this potential and some 
additional votes would enable them to win a seat. If these votes should come from SDP or from 
SDA-SBiH, this would correspond to a re-shuffling within this bloc, and the SBB-lead coalition 
might win a seat instead of SDP or SDA-SBiH. The SBB-lead alliance might, however, also try to 
win additional votes from Serb, Croat and ‘other’ voters. Hence, the bloc of Bosniak and multi-
ethnic parties might only win three mandates (the majority of the seats) if it gets substantial 
support from the other constituent groups and from ‘other’ ethnic minorities.xi 
Or, a coalition of Serb political parties, which have jointly supported the opposition candidate 
Mladen Ivanić in the 2010 presidential elections, might try to win the mandate and secure a 
second Serb seat in the state presidency. As these parties only hold 16-17% of the national vote, 
they would need additional votes to secure the fifth mandate. Either they win them from SNSD, 
which might however cost SNSD its seat, or they present themselves as politically moderates in 
order to attract a significant number of inter-ethnic votes. 
Page 12 
Both the Serb parties and the Bosniak and multi-ethnic parties have thus strong incentives to 
appeal to voters beyond their own constituencies – and the arithmetic properties of the electoral 
system and the population structure put inter-ethnic coalitions to a pole position in the race for the 
fifth seat. Inter-ethnically popular candidates with a non-ethnically exclusive program might have 
best chances to do so. If ethnic belonging determines political affiliation, candidates which are not 
clearly related to any constituent people, i.e. those from mixed-ethnic families, with no ethnically 
defined identity or belonging to an ‘other’ minority, might be particularly promising. 
Lacking up-to-date information about the number of ‘others’, their political behaviour and 
lacking real-world empirical results about the attractiveness of ‘other’ candidates to voters, we can 
only speculate about the chances of ‘others’ to win a seat in the presidency. It is most plausible 
that voters belonging to ‘other’ minorities will not favour ethnic nationalist Bosniak, Serb, or 
Croat candidate, but rather vote for moderates or multi-ethnic candidates, and therefore belong to 
the potential electorate for the inter-ethnically competitive mandate. Their chances of holding the 
pivotal vote for this seat are considerable. Possibly, this would even give enough incentives, either 
to the multi-ethnic parties, or to the Serb coalition, to run with a candidate belonging to ‘others’, 
in order to appeal beyond ethnic boundaries and to win the fifth mandate. We might expect 
‘others’ to attract cross-ethnic votes. Certainly, this is far from guaranteeing that an ‘other’ 
candidate will ever be elected, but given the small share of the population it represents, the 
competitive fifth mandate gives them a fair chance to participate actively in elections. Note that 
the goal of a reform of the electoral system is not necessarily to secure a seat for ‘others’, but 
rather to give them the right to compete and the real possibility to win a seat, if a strong candidate 
should emerge from their group. 
We expect that the discussed electoral system might bring advantages to all ethnic groups in 
some aspects, while not favouring any of them. All members of the presidency are elected on 
equal grounds, and the number of votes decides on the election, whereas the seat guarantee works 
as a backup to assure at least one seat for each constituent people. They would also gain it 
according to their vote share. The electoral formula does not allow a dominance of the largest 
constituent people, as a majority of nominally Bosniak members of the state presidency only 
occurs if one of the three candidates is elected with a multi-ethnic program, and a considerable 
number of voters of other ethnic groups vote for it. The Croats – the only group who is rather 
unlikely to increase its representation in a five-seat presidency beyond one seat – profit, as the 
Komšić scenario (voters belonging to a large ethnic group decide who will represent the smaller 
group) would not be possible any more. Still, voters belonging to one of the larger ethnic groups 
might still vote for candidates of smaller ethnic groups, but in the SNTV model, the smaller 
groups (especially the Croats) are protected through the quasi-proportional nature of the electoral 
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system. Thus, the Croat voters might elect an own candidate with their voting power, even if other 
voters should vote for a different Croat candidate.xii 
The size of five seats is not only given due to arithmetic reasons to revitalise the competition, 
but also because odd numbers allow majoritarian decision-making in small committees.xiii In a 
five-seat presidency, however, new rules would need to be formulated for the ethnic veto. One 
option is a collective veto right for each of the three constituent groups: those constituent people 
that are represented by several members exercise their veto right through a unanimous vote of all 
their representatives. Alternatively, one might restrict the veto right for each constituent people to 
the member of presidency elected with the highest number of votes. Finally, the veto right might 
be formulated in general terms, rather than ethnically based: any two members of the state 
presidency can veto a decision. This still provides a protection against ethnic dominance. All three 
options allow for the conservation of veto rights in a five-seat presidency, without increasing the 
difficulty of decision-making. A five-seat presidency might be more acceptable if its range of 
competences expands. It might get a stronger role within the country’s executive, for instance if it 
gets (some of) the competences of the government, that works in parallel to the presidency. 
7  Electing by the geometric mean? 
The reform options discussed so far closely orient upon the current, ethnically segmented logic of 
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with some inter-ethnic elements. A stronger move towards 
multi-ethnic elections might be offered by the geometric mean rule. 
The election of candidates in divided countries can rely on different logics: who is a candidate 
responsible to, and who is the sovereign that elects a candidate. Particularly, ethnic quotas can be 
applied differently. In the current system, candidates are (should be) elected from voters of their 
own ethnic group to which the seat is guaranteed (cross-ethnic voting might occur). This 
reinforces sectarianism at the extent of nationally elected presidency and inter-ethnic voting. The 
opposite logic, electing candidates in a simple majoritarian voting system would also be 
problematic: the majority of the voters would determine who represents the minority, and they 
might elect a president who nominally (according to the quota rule) belongs to the minority, but 
serves the majority’s political preferences. Ideally, the successful candidate should rely on the 
confidence of the ethnic minority and the majority, so that there is no dilemma of who the 
sovereign is. In deeply divided societies, however, elections rarely provide naturally for 
candidates to obtain most of the votes of the majority and of the minority at the same time. 
Therefore, political institutions should ideally allow the election of a candidate that is acceptable 
to the majority and to the minority, even if no candidate gains most votes in both sovereigns. 
The geometric mean allows the election of candidates who are supported by two different 
sovereigns, and it can be an optimal solution for elections with a protection of (territorially 
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concentrated) minorities.xiv A graphical example with two candidates might best illustrate the 
rationale of the formula (figure 1). Among voters of the majority, candidate A is slightly stronger 
than candidate B, while candidate B is by far stronger among the minority, where candidate A 
hardly wins any votes. In this case, candidate A wins the largest number of votes countrywide, 
and is elected if majoritarian voting rules apply. However, candidate B would undoubtedly be the 
better choice representing both sovereigns: she is the clear favourite of the minority and fairly 
popular among the majority, which makes her the ideal compromise candidate.xv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Candidates with unequally distributed votes from majority and minority voters. 
 
What makes possible the election of candidates that are popular among both the minority and the 
majority is the geometric mean rule. It ensures that the candidate with the highest geometric mean 
(GM) of the votes of the majority (vMAJ) and the votes of the minority (vMIN) gets elected. 
GM = √ (vMAJ · vMIN) 
When comparable degrees of support occur, the formula gives advantage to those candidates 
with a similar vote share both among the majority and the minority, over candidates who are 
primarily preffered by one group only. 
Geometric mean in Bosnia 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the geometric mean might rely on the territorial division of the 
country. Table 3 illustrates different ideas regarding the election of candidates in ethnically 
divided countries, and the effect of the geometric mean, using fictitious numbers. Candidate A is 
strong in RS, candidate C is strong in the Federation, while B scores well in both entities. 
Elections in two distinct electoral units (similar to the current electoral system) would allow each 
community to elect its candidate, in this case A and C. Candidate B loses, despite being the most 
popular across the country, even if she wins absolutely the largest number of votes across the 
country. Hence, under the status quo, the candidate with most votes would get defeated if his or 
her potential electorate is split between the Federation and RS. Since the electoral system 
disincentivises such candidates (and since they can only run in one out of two entities), they do  
minority majority
candidate A
candidate B
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not even emerge. In elections in a single nationwide constituency, where the sum of all votes is 
relevant for the candidate to win, candidate C wins the elections, because she is the strongest 
candidate in the Federation, the larger of the two entities. Consider, however, that C is the most 
polarising candidate, as she wins her votes almost only in the Federation, while A and especially 
B get support from both parts of the country. C wins even if she is only by a very small margin 
ahead of the two candidates that are more popular in whole Bosnia, as only the absolute number of 
votes counts, no matter how unbalanced they are.xvi Under a geometric mean rule, candidate B 
wins the election, as she is supported in both entities, followed by candidate A (second-most 
balanced vote distribution), and candidate C (with the most imbalanced vote distribution). 
Certainly, the absolute number of votes undoubtedly plays a role for the overall result (i.e. if a 
candidate’s votes in each of both entities increase by 1%, then the geometric mean increases to the 
same extent). However, the absolute number of votes is not the solely criterion for election. In the 
present case, with three candidates with a similar sum of votes, the most balanced distribution of 
votes wins the mandate. Hence, candidates with national support – from both entities – have best 
chances to get elected. Given the unequal size of both entities in Bosnia, a weighted geometric 
mean might be the most appropriate solution (see appendix). 
 
  candidate A  candidate B  candidate C 
votes FBiH  150.000  250.000  500.000 
votes RS  350.000  250.000  20.000 
 
electoral result, according to different rules 
election in two 
electoral units 
elected in RS  not elected  elected in FBiH 
sum of votes 
FBiH + RS 
500.000 
(2.) 
500.000 
(2.) 
520.000 
(1.) 
Geom. mean 
√ FBiH ∙ RS 
229.129 
(2.) 
250.000 
(1.) 
100.000 
(3.) 
Modified geom. 
mean 
3√ FBiH2 ∙ RS 
198.953 
(2.) 
250.000 
(1.) 
170.998 
(3.) 
Table 3: Different majority rules, applied on a fictitious example of three candidates A, B, and C, 
winning votes in two entities FBiH and RS. 
 
The geometric mean might be applied for the election of a single president (instead of three 
members), who would need gain votes from both entities: the candidate with the highest 
geometric mean of the votes from the Federation and from RS wins the election. Such a solution 
would, however, reduce the state presidency nominally to the member of one ethnic group, and 
lower the chances of ethnic Croats to get elected: they count fewer voters in the Federation than 
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the Bosniaks, and are not protected by a territorial rule. Therefore, a presidency of several 
members might be more acceptable. The geometric mean might be applied for the election of a 
state presidency of three members with two votes per voter, or of a five member-presidency, with 
a seat guarantee for the three constituent people, and with two or three votes per voter. Since 
electors have several votes, political parties are offered the opportunity to join in lists of 
candidates across entity borders. Giving them fewer votes than the number of candidates to be 
elected introduces a semi-proportional element to protect political minorities (especially the 
Bosnian Croats).xvii 
 
 
Intended consequences of a geometrical mean rule in the Bosnian case 
The application of the geometric mean would stimulate candidates to campaign nationally, as they 
can only be elected with support from both entities. We expect that this might have three impor-
tant implications. 
First, candidates from genuinely multi-ethnic parties, scoring well in both parts of the country, 
would be in advantage over those belonging to parties that are related only to one entity. This 
would incite parties to lead national instead of sectarian campaigns, appealing to more than one of 
the ethnic groups. 
Second, for ethnically oriented candidates counting mainly on the votes of one ethnic group, it 
would become largely important to secure votes from both entities, by campaigning for the 
electors of their ethnic group in both entities. This would make ethnically Bosniak and Croat 
voters in the RS and Serbian voters in the Federation - those who are marginalised in the present 
system - a particularly precious electorate. 
Third, the need for support in both entities would also motivate parties and candidates to 
cooperate across entity borders. Therefore, parties with their stronghold in different entities would 
be strongly incited to present a common list of candidates, in order to secure that their candidates 
would gain substantial support from across the country. Such cooperation can be widely strategic 
(e.g.  Fraenkel & Grofman 2006, pp. 639-643). Nevertheless, any cross-entity cooperation is 
widely facilitated by (even a minimal) common program. This incentivises ethnically based 
parties to enter political cooperation across entity boundaries, and helps to establish a functional 
government.  
 
8  Outlook 
The current institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina make it difficult to pass any legislation in the 
ordinary way. Moreover, to date, processes of institutional reform are blocked – especially when 
they regard the sensitive balance between the ethnic groups. Against this background, the 
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European Court of Human Rights’ judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case comes like a godsend: in a 
nutshell, the court’s sentence judges the election rules of the state presidency as illegal, as only 
members of the three constituent people – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs – can be elected, while 
other ethnic groups (Roma, Jews, others) are excluded. However, the significance of this court 
ruling goes far beyond the question of allowing Roma, Jews, or ‘others’ to stand as candidates for 
the Bosnian state presidency. If Bosnian politics were to respect the court’s judgement (which, at 
the time of writing, is not evident), an electoral reform would be needed, which might make the 
so-far ethnically structured state presidency more inclusive. 
While observers often advocate reforms to eliminate the ethnically based political institutions 
in Bosnia, such solutions can be considered dangerous, as they might leave the smaller constituent 
people with no substantial power. Most of all, reforms that abolish ethnic representation pledges 
appear politically unattainable. In this paper, we discussed potential reforms of the election rules 
for the state presidency with a view to the guaranteed representation of the three constituent 
people, but opening the competition for non ethnically organised interests, fostering cross-ethnic 
alliances and voting, which cannot be foreseen in the philosophy of today’s institutional 
framework.  
 A single nationwide constituency might allow inter-ethnic voting and incite candidates to 
propose a cross-ethnically acceptable program, eliminate the discriminatory nature of the 
presidential election for Croats and Bosniaks in the ‘Republika Srpska’ and Serbs in the 
Federation, while guaranteeing the representation of all constituent people. 
 A five-member state presidency (instead of today’s three members) allows the inclusion 
of members who are not elected exclusively on ethnic grounds. It allows candidates 
belonging to not constituent ethnic groups or ‘others’ to run for office. Combined with the 
single non-transferable vote, it might make elections more dynamic, creating strounger 
incentives for parties to address voters across ethnic lines. The increase in the size of the 
presidency would allow to newly define the veto rules of each constituent people, and to 
change the institutional structure of the executive. 
 The geometric mean rule for the election of the state presidency might potentially change 
the political landscape in Bosnia. It would empower candidates who get support from all 
parts of the country, encourage cross-ethnic alliances, and genuinely national elections. 
While the propositions are developed specifically for the election of a small committee such as the 
state presidency, analogous solutions might be feasible also for other levels of elections in Bosnia. 
Electoral rules are, however, not only valued on their hypothetical results (which given the 
innovative character of several of the proposals would first need to be tested) – but also on their 
procedural legitimacy: the way of adaptation through the domestic political players. Any 
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sustainable solution can only be adopted if it appears as legitimate to the domestic actors. In this 
context, the prospects of electoral reforms can all too often be characterised as a catch-22 
dilemma: even if large parts of the sovereign might possibly favour a move towards not solely 
ethnically defined politics, the representatives elected in the current system are the ones to decide 
which rules might get adopted, and they are unlikely to dimiss the institution that holds them in 
power. 
However, after the 2006 and 2010 elections, the representation of all dominant parties of all 
the three constituent groups is at stake: repeatedly, the race for the Croat member of the state 
presidency was decided by Bosniak voters, and in 2010, Bosniak voters in the ‘Republika Srpska’ 
only narrowly failed to have a pivotal role in the election to the Serbian member of the 
presidency. Finally, the race for the Bosniak member of the presidency gets close, and none of the 
Bosniak parties can rely on a secure mandate, while a second Bosniak member of the state 
presidency would give them more security. Hence, several of the ruling parties might have 
reasons to switch to a different electoral system. The rule of the European Court for Human 
Rights might offer an important drive to start the reform process. 
 
Appendix: Weighted Geometric Mean Formula 
For countries with unequally sized entities, we advise the use of a weighted geometrical mean 
formula. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, given the population structure and political requirements, 
the most appropriate form of the geometric mean is a modified formula, based on the cube root. 
Without this modification, each entity would have the same impact on the result, so that votes 
from the smaller entity (RS) would count relatively more than those from the Federation. 
For instance, if a candidate wins 2000 votes in the Federation and 1000 votes in ‘Republika 
Srpska’, a 10% increase of the votes in the Federation (from 2000 to 2200) would have the same 
impact as a 10% increase in the ‘Republika Srpska’ (from 1000 to 1100). This would be a good 
solution only if one wants to overweight the votes from ‘Republika Srpska’. 
In the Bosnian context, the principle of ‘one person – one vote’ should apply, and the formula 
should consider that the number of voters is roughly twice as large in the Federation, compared to 
‘Republika Srpska’, and the 2:1 ratio determines the seat allocation in public institutions. Hence,  
doubling the votes of a candidate in the Federation should have an effect two times greater than 
doubling the votes in the twice smaller ‘Republika Srpska’. This is respected if the formula is 
adapted to GMw = 3√ (vFED2 · vRS). Generally, for countries with two unequally sized entities 
with a population share a and b (a+b= 100%), with votes va and vb, the applying weighted 
geometric mean formula is GMw = vaa · vbb. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, judgment of 22 December 2009. Similar problems apply for the election of the second 
chamber of the parliament (Venice Commission 2001). 
iii See also Bochsler (2010) for a more extensive discussion. 
iv Similarly, candidate-based quotas were introduced for the election of members of small minorities in the local 
elections of 2008, but the elected candidates for small minorities in some cases belong to political parties which 
are known as the representatives of one of the constitutional nations – rather than of a small minority (Crnjanski-
Vlajčić & Fetahagić 2009). 
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v The website www.ustavnareforma.ba [last accessed on 17 December 2010] collects propositions by political 
parties and other actors for the reform of the Bosnian state presidency. Among others, the propositions by SDA 
and GDS BiH (not dated), HDZ (14 July 2010), HDZ-1990 (1 July 2010), SBiH (27 January 2010), SBB (juin 
2010), Naša Stranka (31 August 2009). Further, “Političke i ustavno-pravna platforma Stranke za BiH“ (1 
August 2006). 
vi Narodna Skupština, Deklaracija o osnovama za razgovore o eventualnim promjenama ustava Bosne i 
Hercegovine i o zaštiti interesa Republike Srpske, 25. mart 2009. 
http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/lat/zipovi/ostalaakta/Deklaracija_o_osnovama_za_razgovore_o_eventualnim
_promjenama_Ustava_BiH_i_o_zastiti_interesa_RS.pdf [accessed on 17 December 2010] 
vii Slight changes in the rules, which are discussed as a reaction to the court rule, – for instance if the member of 
presidency elected from ‘Republika Srpska’ would no longer need to be a Serb – are, however, little convincing. 
They would only virtually return the right to be candidate to Bosniaks, ethnic Croats, and ‘others’ living in 
‘Republika Srpska’: de facto, the elections remain ethnically based, as a consequence of the new ethnic Serb 
dominance in this entity. 
viii As parties need to behave strategically when determining how many candidates they present, and votes need 
to be divided evenly among these candidates, the SNTV implies a difficult coordination. Coordination is, 
however, more difficult for large ethnic groups than for smaller ones. 
ix Parliamentary elections are held by PR in large districts (14 and 28 mandates), with the Sainte-Laguë formula 
and no legal electoral threshold, so that the psychological effect of the electoral system is negligible, and results 
correspond widely to the real voting potential. Electoral thresholds apply for the regional seat allocation, but not 
so for the seat allocation in the two relevant electoral districts. 
We do not rely on results of presidential elections, as the field of candidates and the vote distribution is affected 
by the majoritarian electoral rules. Particularly, strategic voting would lead to an overestimation of the potential 
of ethnic Croat SDP voters. 
x If votes are distributed almost equally on six candidates, 16.7% of the votes might be necessary for a seat. With 
more candidates running, the maximal threshold of exclusion might drop. Seat guarantees matter, if guaranteed 
seats are allocated to candidates scoring substantially less votes than 16.7%. This might occur if a Croat 
candidate would be elected on a guaranteed seat with a lower vote share. This would occur, a) if there is no 
unique Croat candidate, so that Croat votes are split on several candidates. However, in this situation, the 
assumption of almost equally distributed votes does not hold, so that the threshold of exclusion does not rise; b) 
if a massively lower turnout among Croat voters occurs, it results in a drop in the the votes for Croat candidates . 
This would positively affect the threshold of exclusion and the vote shares of Bosniak, Serb, and multi-ethnic 
parties, to an equal degree, so that the calculations on which our scenario is based are not affected; c) Most 
ethnic Croats vote for non ethnic Croat candidates. This would lead to higher vote shares for non-Croat 
candidates, but also increase the threshold of exclusion for them. 
17-18% might usually be a correct approximation of the threshold of exclusion. If a Croat wins a guaranteed seat 
with 12% of the votes (and no other Croat candidates win votes), the threshold of exclusion rises to 17.6%. 
xi The Single Transferable Vote (STV) – a preferential voting system – shares many features with the SNTV, and 
many of the arguments made for the SNTV might equally be valid for the STV also. In this paper, we focus on 
the SNTV, as it imposes higher coordination costs for the political majority (here: the Bosniaks), and therefore, 
can help the minority to win substantial representation. STV would have the advantage over the SNTV to allow 
for intra-group competition also within small minorities (here: the Croats – which however in the discussed 
model is secured by the seat guarantee – ensuring a mandate in the state presidency for the Croats, even if their 
votes are divided over several candidates). 
xii De facto, ethnic Croats with their voting power almost have the necessary number of votes to elect their own 
member of presidency. If Bosniak voters should decide to vote for a Croat candidate, who is supported solely by 
Bosniaks, they might elect him or her (on the side of the candidate elected by the Croats themselves), but their 
incentives are very low – as the same number of votes would also most likely allow them to elect a Bosniak 
member, so that strategic voting does pay out. Strategic voting might only be successful if it occurs in very large 
numbers and the Croat votes are heavily split on different candidates – simulations might establish the threshold 
beyond which such a scenario is likely. We expect that to be difficult to reach. 
xiii Certainly, if the number of members is even, the chairperson might decide, but this entails the risk of strategic 
games over the agenda, so that key decisions are scheduled for those meetings or periods when the right 
chairperson is in office, and can give the decisive vote. 
xiv A similar proposition has been discussed by Bogaards (2003). As it is based on artificial thresholds, it is less 
flexible and enables deadlocks where no candidate can be elected, leaving space for paradoxes. 
xv For such a real-world situation, see Barben (2010) 
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xvi Note that in a multimember election in a single nationwide constituency by the single non-transferable vote, C 
would get elected, but also candidates with strong support from the other entity, or candidates with overall 
equally strong support, but coming from both entities. 
xvii The logic of the limited vote, which works similar as the SNTV (see Grofman 1999; Lijphart 1984 for a 
discussion). This semi-proportional element makes strategic voting of Bosniak voters for nominally Croat candi-
dates, which do represent the Bosniaks’ interests, ineffective. In a semi-proportional system, if Bosniaks try to 
elect a candidate of their preference on the guaranteed seat for Croats – as in such situation, the Croats might 
have sufficient voting potential to elect a candidate of their preference (on a ballot of a party that is strong in 
RS). 
